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Abstract 
 
The plantain is an important agricultural product worldwide. It is the staple food of millions of 
people, and represents a source of incomes for farmers participating in the international trade. In 
Colombia, the exportation plantain is chiefly harvested by small-scale farmers. However, they 
are in a position of vulnerability, facing several risks. Firstly, the obstacles to access the global 
markets, and the competition with the trader companies. Secondly, the volatility of prices and the 
exchange rate, which produce unequal effects on them. Thirdly, the environmental risks 
associated with windstorms and tree diseases. Amid the economic liberalization, the small-scale 
farmers lack a permanent governmental support to cope with those risks. And the international 
cooperation is unable to support all the growers. Thus, the small-scale farmers have created 
organizations to raise their demands, amid nationwide peasant protests against the Free Trade 
Agreements. 
 
Key words: value chains, plantain, Colombia, small-scale farmers, contract farming, global 
trade 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Processes of agrarian change in the global agrarian South include, in recent decades, the division 
between an export-oriented sector with access to global markets, and peasants working in petty 
commodity production; but peasants also engage in the so-called pluri-activity, as a survival 
strategy amid the expansion of neoliberal policies (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010). The complex 
and varied roles of peasants in areas with export-oriented agro-industries, are identified in the 
plantain economy in Colombia. It is characterized by the rising involvement of small-scale 
farmers, owning farms of size between 1 and 3 hectares, to cultivate to sell to trader companies 
that commercialize plantain in international markets. Despite the growing weight of plantain in 
the global economy, and the increasing role of small-scale farmers in the production, there is a 
paucity of studies that analyze the relationship between global economic trends, and the local 
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social, economic, political, and environmental conflicts in areas of plantain production in 
Colombia. 
 
The plantain agro-industry has various key characteristics. Few intermediaries such as the trader 
companies directly or indirectly control plantations, and buy the product to small-scale farmers 
to sell it to multinationals and importers in other countries. This trend relates to the expansion of 
labor modalities such as the contract farming in agribusiness (Little and Watts, 1994; Grossman, 
1998; Li, 2011). Even so, the small-scale farmers aim at having their own commercialization 
companies, because the intermediaries grab the greater portion of benefits in the value chains. 
The consumption of plantain in countries of the global North is rising due to the migration of 
populations from the South (USAID, 2009). In countries torn by armed conflicts, the plantain has 
also gained importance as an alternative product in programs of reintegration of ex-combatants 
as in Colombia (Rel-UITA, 2005a; Rel-UITA, 2005b; USAID, 2009). Even so, the expansion of 
plantain has also been associated to some cases of primitive accumulation as in Urabá and Chocó 
(García and Aramburo, 2011; ColombiaLand.org, 2013; CIJP, 2012). This paper analyze those 
multiple inequalities associated to the cultivation of plantain, which are similar to those 
inequalities found in the banana economy (Grossman, 1998). The paper also studies some cases 
in which the organizations of small-scale farmers have emerged, amid the nationwide peasant 
protests against the Free Trade Agreements. 
 
The examination of the plantain economy is relevant, as it is an important staple food and a 
source of incomes, but also because different international aid agencies design programs to 
benefit plantain small-scale farmers (USAID, 2009). Those aid programs should take into 
consideration that the farmers are exposed to unequal competition and environmental risks, 
which do not receive a permanent response by the government. 
 
This article aims to analyze the inequalities existing in the plantain value chain in Colombia. A 
main question guiding the article is: ¿Which are the risks affecting the plantain small-scale 
farmers, and what are the roles of the trader companies in the agribusiness expansion and in the 
production of inequalities, amid the neoliberal globalization?. My methodology includes the 
analysis of statistical data on the global and national plantain value chain and markets. I 
complement this analysis, with the critical appraisal of reports from trader associations, social 
organizations, NGOs, newspaper articles, and media sources. After presenting a literature review 
on peasants, agribusiness and contract farming, the article analyzes the trends in the plantain 
global economy; thereafter, the article focuses on the Colombian plantain value chain, the risks 
and vulnerability experienced by the small-scale farmers, and the roles of the trader companies. 
 
2. Peasants, agribusiness, and contract farming  
In the last decades, the agribusiness expanded, with an important portion of small-scale farmers 
in the agrarian South producing commodities for the global markets. Those growers provide a 
regular supply of foods that guarantee a diversified diet for workers in different countries and 
regions, including fish, fruits and vegetables (McMichael, 2009). Since the 1980s, a new 
“corporate food regime” was shaped, which consolidated “differential supply chains including a 
supermarket revolution” (2009: 142). 
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The peasantry in the agrarian South is exposed to the effects of this liberalization, amid the 
“corporate food regime” (McMichael, 2009: 148). Institutions such as the WTO, World Bank, 
and IMF, have established a global regulation of trade of agro-industrial products. The free trade 
rhetoric spread, reproducing global inequalities. The agricultural subsidies to farmers remain in 
the global North, while the governments in the global South remove barriers, increase the 
imports of food, and the exports of high value products such as fish, fruits and vegetables (2009, 
148).  
 
Many countries in the global South have developed two sub-sectors in their rural economy: one 
that responds to the global trade, producing for exporting to global markets; and another peasant 
pity-production subsector, an heterogeneous group primarily composed by small-scale farmers 
that produce for local markets and for self-consumption (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010). These 
processes produce a semi-proletarization process, because peasants are obliged to sell their labor, 
while they engage in subsistence farming (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010).  
 
Recent trends in agricultural production include the production in industrial modalities, and/or 
alliances between agro-entrepreneurs and farmers to produce “flex crops” (e.g. soy beans, sugar 
cane, oil palm and maize), for multiple and industrial uses including food, animal feed, and 
inputs for agro-fuels (Borras et al., 2012). However, in some agricultural sectors such as 
plantain, a growing trend has been the involvement of small-scale farmers (USAID, 2009), 
which sell the product to trader companies, through the contract farming scheme. In the 1980s, 
emerged a literature on contract farming and the agribusiness capital. The contract farming was 
not a novel arrangement. It had origin in colonial periods, in the indigo plantations in India 
(Gupta, 1992) and sugar plantations in Asia (Ka, 1991). This system aims to coordinate 
production responding to the vertical concentration existing in some agribusiness sectors, aiming 
to supervise the production among great quantity of producers (Grossman 1993: 348; Singh, 
2005: 5578). Primary producers sell the production to the firms, at a pre-agreed price and 
quantity. The use of this scheme grew during the contemporary global corporate agribusiness 
(Little and Watts, 1994). In theory, the small and large-scale farmers should benefit from these 
guaranteed markets, by reducing uncertainty existing in free markets (Grossman, 1998). 
 
However, different works have identified several problems associated to the contract farming 
system. The control by the governments of the peasant labor process can produce “conflicts 
between export cropping and local food production and magnify environmental problems” 
(Grossman, 1993: 348). When the contract farming is promoted in smallholding areas, it “may 
accelerate (the) differentiation and disintegration (of peasants) by converting rich peasants into 
peasant capitalists” as in Chile (Korovkin, 1992). Thus, it does not produce a proletarianization 
of the local peasantry. Contract farming may led to “ill-effects in the spheres of livelihoods of 
producers, community organizations and other institutions, environment, and gender” as in 
Africa and Latin America (Singh, 2006: 5578). Despite it may produce incomes and employment 
increases in initial stages of its application (Benziger, 1996), the relationship between firms and 
workers tends by worsen, producing ecological degradation and destruction of other local 
economies (Singh, 2006). Contracts tend to be “inequitable, short-term, and ambiguous” (Singh, 
2006: 5578). In the banana sector, it “does not translate into equal playing fields between banana 
growers and buyers” (Andreatta, 1999: 37). Thus, the terms of the contracts, and the situation of 
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farmers depend on, and is affected by the role of the state, which can offer or not protection to 
the producers (Benziger, 1996).  
 
Works on contract farming in the banana industry, charge that this modality is rooted in the local 
socio-economic production schemes, and it is difficult to be eradicated. Ecuador nationalized the 
banana industry achieving the withdrawal of multinational corporations, but the peasants did not 
dismantled the contract farming system, as “they were unable to determine the broad contours 
through which this system of production emerged” (Striffler, 2001). Contract farming has been 
taken as a “defining feature of late capitalism” (2001: 209). The multinationals have not been 
“defeated”, neither the banana economy has adopted a less repressive production system (Hough, 
2012). However, contracting has not emerged and evolved in the same way in different periods 
and contexts. It is just another form of “capitalist reproduction and accumulation” that “must be 
seen in its political form, where working-class people are not merely responding to structural 
processes, but are in fact central to the (at times unequal) struggles that drive those processes” 
(Striffler, 2001: 210).  
 
However, besides identifying a kind of “responsibility” of the farmers in sustaining the contract 
farming scheme (Striffler, 2001), this does not mean that those farmers are not constantly 
affected by economic and environmental risks, and that they claim their rights, in opposition to 
the free trade and the risks associated to the economic liberalization. In the current liberal 
economic system, the market imperatives define which product they should harvesting; and the 
intermediaries in value chains are in a better position to compete in those markets, putting the 
costs and losses on the small-scale farmers. The risks, and the effects of climatic dynamics, 
produce that the growers demand protection from the state, claiming for market regulation, and 
protection for the national production.  
 
3. World plantain production and trade 
 
Since the 1960s, the world production of plantain has steadily grown (Figure 1 in the Appendix). 
In 2012, the world production reached more than 35 million tons (FAOSTAT, 2014). Main 
plantain producer country worldwide is Uganda, reaching more than 9 million tons in 2012 
(Figure 2). It is followed by Ghana, Cameroon, Colombia, Rwanda, Nigeria, Peru, Ivory Coast 
and Tanzania. Thus, the world production is led by African countries, and Colombia leads the 
production in Latin America, and is the fourth producer globally (FAO-STAT, 2014).  
 
Despite the greater importance of African countries in world production, the global trade is led 
by Latin American countries. In 2011, three countries concentrated almost the 70% of the global 
exports: Peru (25,8%), Guatemala (24,4%) and Colombia (20,81%). Table 1 also shows that the 
value is higher for Peru´s plantains, but the Colombia´s plantain reaches higher value than the 
Guatemala´s fruits. 
 
The main destination country for exports is the United States, which reached the 40% of global 
imports of plantain in 2011 (Table 2). Other countries with higher weight in its plantain imports 
are the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain, El Salvador, and Colombia. Those 
trends are explained by various processes and facts: firstly, the global plantain market rose due to 
the increasing migration from Latinos and populations from the Caribbean to the United States, 
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and from those regions, Asia and Africa to Europe. Secondly, Colombia is an important importer 
country, chiefly due to the rising imports of plantain from Ecuador at lower prices than those 
existing in Colombia (USAID, 2009; Agrocadenas, 2004; Corporación Colombia Internacional, 
2000).  
 
4. Colombia’s plantain value chain, areas of production, and land conflicts 
 
Figure 3 presents the plantain value chain emanating from the Urabá region, including the stages 
of inputs, production, and the domestic and international commercialization, distribution and 
consumption.  
 
The cropped area is divided into the areas for production of regular plantain for the national 
markets, and the production for export to international markets. The area cropped for the national 
consumption has not grown significantly since the end of the 1980s. In 2012, it reached almost 
378 thousand hectares. 
 
At the regional level, the region with the main levels of production for export plantain is Urabá 
in Antioquia. While the area cropped for domestic consumption there reached more than 45 
thousand hectares in 2012, the area for exportation crops reached more than 16.146 hectares, 
which represents almost the entire area for export crops in Colombia (17.033 ha). The rest of 
export plantain is produced in Quindío. A special characteristic in the production for exports, is 
that the area cropped for this goal has increased since the 1980s: in 1987 it reached 6.080 ha; in 
1991 it experimented a major increase to 23.000 ha; it declined to 10.880 ha in 1997; in 2002 it 
reached 17.849 ha; since then, it remained almost steady until 2012 when it reached 16.146 ha 
(see Table 3).  
 
The plantain production for international markets shows an increasing trend between the end of 
the 1980s and the 1990s, though with some decreasing peaks between 1993 and 1997. After 
reaching the highest level of production in 2000, with almost 160.000 tons, it decreased and has 
presented a relatively steady trend during the 2000s, reaching between 120.000 and 140.000 tons 
(Figure 4).  
 
On the contrary, the national production for domestic commercialization has presented a more 
sustained rising trend since 1987, with an important decreasing peak in 2000. In recent years, the 
production level reaches almost 3.100.000 tons (Figure 5).  
 
In the country, the plantain harvesting modality presents various types, but the most used form is 
the association of the crop with other crops such as coffee, cacao, cassava, and fruit trees; just 
13% of the production is cropped in the form of agro-industrial monoculture with advanced 
technology; additionally, the plantain economy produces almost 286.000 direct employments per 
year (by 2004), which means that almost 57 thousand families obtained benefits from its 
production (Agrocadenas, 2004). 
 
In Urabá, the main type of harvested plantain is the Hartón (Musa AAB Simonds). A key 
characteristic is that it is produced chiefly by small-holder producers. The permanent plantain 
crop gained relevancy in Urabá, due to the lower profitability of transitory crops such as maize 
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and rice (Agrocadenas, 2004). In the 1970s started the exports to the United States, when the 
UNIBAN and BANACOL trader companies were created, and in 1988 started the exports to 
Europe, with participation of the SUNISA trader company (Agrocadenas, 2004). The 
associations that initially sought to develop this sector in the region, were ASPLATU and 
COOPAURABÁ (Agrocadenas, 2004). 
 
Figure 3. The plantain value chain emanating from Urabá 
 
Source: the author, based on Challies and Murray (2011: 45). 
 
The Urabá plantain producers have been classified into four groups, depending on the size of the 
farms (Agrocadenas, 2004; Corporación Colombia Internacional, 2000): small producers (from 
0,1 to 5 hectares); medium producers (from 5,1 to 15 hectares); large producers (from 15 to 30 
hectares); and entrepreneurial producers (more than 30 hectares). In Urabá, in 2000, it was 
estimated that almost 90% of the producers (almost 3.000 families) were small producers, 
including family farms between 1 and 2 hectares (Corporación Colombia Internacional, 2000). 
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Those small producers produce in combination with other subsistence crops, and they produce 
plantain for self-consumption, and for feeding farm animals.  
 
The cultivation of plantain has been concentrated in few municipalities: Turbo, Necoclí, San 
Juan de Urabá, and Arboletes; followed by Chigorodó and Carepa (García and Aramburo, 2011). 
The expansion of plantain in Urabá – alongside with the loss of weight of other products such as 
maize and rice in the regional production – has been associated to trends of the political regional 
conflicts. The plantain expansion coincided with the demobilization process of paramilitaries 
implemented between 2003 and 2007, the expelling of peasants considered as guerrilla-
supporters, and the re-population led by the paramilitary groups in the region (García and 
Aramburo, 2011: 388). One of the problems associated to this trend, is that the plantain cropped 
areas spread at the cost of forced displacement of groups of peasants in some places, also by 
expanding the agricultural frontier towards Chocó, in processes of primitive accumulation 
(García and Aramburo, 2011). 
 
Accordingly, the plantain economy exemplifies the impacts of the global markets, via the trader 
companies, on the local land rights, producing also primitive accumulation. The plantain 
expansion exerts pressure on new territories such as the lower Atrato in Chocó, near to Urabá. 
Some of the new plantain ventures have been introduced in lands that were seized through 
violence and corruption to introduce oil palm crops, under the leadership of paramilitary groups. 
After the crisis of the oil palm that lasted until 2008, new crops spread including cassava and 
plantain. But those lands remain under dispute between the local communities, and diverse actors 
including the banana trader companies such as UNIBAN and BANACOL (ColombiaLand.org, 
2013; CIJP, 2012). There, the big trader companies place new growers to crop plantain, and buy 
the product to them through contract farming. However, as I will further analyze, the trader 
companies contradict themselves, because they are aiming to include new lands into the 
agribusiness, by putting growers contracted by them to grow plantain; and recently, the trader 
companies are stating that the small-scale farmers should change their product because the 
market has an over-supply. Thus, the goals behind the plantain expansion have included those of 
accumulating lands, as those lands are directly or indirectly controlled by the trader companies. 
 
The production patterns in Colombia and Urabá have been split into the division between agro-
industries using mechanized methods to produce with high standards of quality, and the peasant 
economy unable to compete with the sectors using high technology. However, the plantain has 
been located as a third or alternative category, because it is being produced in small farms which 
are ecologically-sustainable; it has also some characteristics of the banana production, such as 
the use of gathering and commercialization canals for the banana exportation. As some authors 
have noted, 
“despite producing in a separate way, the plantain growers achieve a minimum of 
collective organization by specializing in this production, and planning the expansion on 
land which are adjacent to roads. This is because the Free on Board Price (FOB) depends 
on this basic infrastructure of production” (García and Aramburo, 2011: 387).  
 
The data on production yields, shows that in recent years, Colombia reached yields of 7,3 ton/ha, 
which is over the world average yields of 6,3 ton/ha, and of other producers such as Nigeria 
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(6,3). However, the Colombian yields are under the level of countries such as Ghana (9,7), Peru 
(12,2), Kenya (14,4), and Myanmar (10,5) (USAID, 2009: 4). 
 
A main factor that affects the production and yields relates to the effects of phytosanitary 
problems such as tree diseases, chiefly the Sigatoka Negra (Mycosphaerella fijiensis), which also 
increases the cost of production. Other phytosanitary problems emerge from the use of lower 
quality seeds, which produce the emergence of plagues and tree diseases such as the Picudo 
Negro, and el Moco (USAID; 2009; Corporación Colombia Internacional, 2000). Most losses of 
about 10% are given in postharvest. 
 
The structure of production costs depends of the type of technology used. The region using more 
technology in Colombia is Meta, which reach higher yields, of almost 16 ton/ha (Corporación 
Colombia Internacional, 2000). In Urabá, in 2002, was estimated that establishing and sustaining 
one hectare of plantain Hartón, with “density of cropping of 1.300 plant per hectare, in a 
production cycle of 5 years, the estimated cost was $13.912.900 pesos”, including costs of labor 
and inputs (Agrocadenas, 2004: 15). In the first year, the share between labor and inputs was 
almost 50% and 50%; for the subsequent four years, the share was 60,5% and 39,5% 
respectively; and the major costs are caused by the fertilizers (27,4%), weeding (18,1%),  and 
harvesting (12,1%) (Secretaría de Agricultura de Antioquia, cited in: Agrocadenas, 2004: 16). 
However, the structure of costs within Urabá varies, depending on the climatic, infrastructural 
(drainage canals, transport) and technological aspects. Thus, the costs have been higher in the 
municipalities of Mutatá and Carepa, followed by Aparatadó and Turbo (Agrocadenas, 2004). 
 
4.1. Domestic commercialization and prices 
The canals for the commercialization of plantain vary and include many producers and few 
wholesellers which broadly distribute the product. The few wholesellers participate in the 
fixation of prices. The information on the market conditions flows rapidly in the chain, and thus, 
the wholesellers fix the prices.  
 
In the domestic commercialization, there are five main commercialization canals, also showed in 
the Figure: i) Centro de Acopio-wholeseller-retailer; ii) trader-wholeseller-supermarkets; iii) 
producers-supermarkets; iv) wholeseller-agroindustries; and v) producers- agroindustries 
(Agrocadenas, 2004: 8). The Centro de Acopio-wholeseller-retailer is the most used canal. The 
Centro de Acopio buy the plantain in the producer areas, including the farms, or the regional 
markets; the Centro de Acopio fixes the price in function of the supply, and the expected prices 
in the wholeseller central areas (centros mayoristas). The product is collected in the roads by 
transporters. The transporters have a contract with the wholesellers, or with various producers, to 
transport the product to the local marketplace (plazas de mercado) (Agrocadenas, 2004: 8).  
 
When the producers sell directly to the supermarkets, they obtain more benefits, avoiding the 
intermediation, and reaching the same price obtained by the wholesellers. Recently, the cost of 
production and the structure of prices in Urabá has been estimated in this way (TeleAntioquia, 
2014):  
Jairo Baquero Melo – VALUE CHAINS AND GLOBAL INEQUALITIES 
 
9 
 
- for a small grower the cost of production for unit of plantain reaches $ 130 pesos in 
average;2  
- the intermediaries (revendedores) buy each plantain in the farms at $ 150 pesos;  
- the plantains are sold in local stores in Urabá at $ 300 pesos;  
- but in large cities such as Bogotá and Medellín, the price reaches between 800 and 1000 
pesos.  
 
Thus, a large portion of the benefits are taken by the intermediaries when the producers do not 
sell directly to the supermarkets and retailers. However, the producers do not have the 
infrastructure of transport to carry the plantain to the final areas of commercialization and 
consumption. 
 
4.2. International commercialization and prices 
The commercialization for international markets have been constructed upon the existing 
infrastructure of the banana exportation trade, taking advantage also of the vertical integration of 
the banana sector. The trader companies that export the fruit has its own factories to produce 
packages, plastic bags and stamps. The trader companies contract the transportation services with 
vessels which load and storage the product in their own warehouses in the United States. And the 
plantain is distributed by the subsidiaries of those companies within the US. 
 
The total of exported plantain boxes reached 5.13 million in 2010, falling to 3,58 million in 
2011, and rising to 4,21 million in 2012. In Urabá, there are four major trader companies leading 
the international trade. In order of their weight in exports of boxes for 2012, they are UNIBAN 
(44,9%), BANACOL (30,7%), CONSERBA (13,4%) and BANUR (11%). The weight formerly 
reached by BANUR has been gained by CONSERBA in recent years (Table 4).  
 
The plantain growers have contracts of provision with the trader companies, which provide the 
producers with technical backup. The producers shall reach the minimum standards of quality, 
which all the small-scale farmers are not able to reach. For example, I found in my data that a 
small grower cultivating in a terrain of 3 hectares rented with his neighbor – and rising three 
children –, stated that he “crop(s) plantain for the local market, because he does not produce with 
the demanded quality standards for exporting”. In his words,  
“We, the plantain growers, are abandoned. We do not export, because we do not have the 
way to do that, and do not have the means to buy inputs, such as plastic bags, and what the 
companies require” (Testimony of the grower José Doria; TeleAntioquia, 2014). 
 
Main import countries of Colombian plantain are the United States (73%), Belgium (15%), 
United Kingdom (11%), and Germany (1%), of the total of 101.775 tons exported in 2008 
(USAID, 2009). The plantain commercialization chain is shorter than other fruits chains. Import 
companies have relationship with the trader companies in Colombia. And then, the import 
companies distribute the plantain in supermarkets and wholeseller markets (Agrocadenas, 2004; 
USAID, 2009). In recent years, the Free on Board (FOB) Price of exportation plantain from 
Colombia has shown rising trends: from 9,17 US dollars in 2010, to 11,16 US dollars in 2013 
                                                  
2
 The production costs for hectare reach almost 8 million pesos, and the growers harvest almost 1200 plants (El 
Colombiano, 2014). 
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(Figure 6). There are also exports of processed plantain in the forms of flour, meal, and powder. 
In 2008, the exports of processed plantain reached 39,45 tons, valued in 298.055 US$ FOB, 
chiefly traded to Venezuela and UK (USAID, 2009). 
 
Since 2013, the importation prices in the European Union of Colombian plantain, shows various 
characteristics, such as in the case of import prices per Kg in the French market (Figure 7). On 
the one hand, the plantain reaches a price of around one euro, with small variations below and 
above; the maximum high price (H-Price) reached almost 1,3 euros per Kg; and the lower prices 
fell in 2013, but in 2014 they have shown relatively more stability, and have not fallen below 
0,95 euro in this period. On the other hand, the Figure also shows the prices for Ecuadorian 
plantains, one of the major competitors of Colombia. Ecuador’s plantain prices  are in average 
near 0,90 euros, below the Colombian prices. 
 
Another relevant trend, is that the Colombian imports have grown since the 1990s. In 1995 the 
imports reached 22.384 tons, and raised to 66.327 tons in 2008. Imports represented near a 2,6% 
of the national consumption (USAID, 2009). Plantains are almost entirely imported from 
Ecuador, primarily of Hartón and maduro plantain, which is sold in cities at the west Colombia, 
but also in Bogotá, Medellín and Barranquilla. The prices in the national market of plantains 
from Urabá reach between $795 and $1156 pesos per Kg. However, these prices are affected by 
natural disasters such as storms, and by the imports from Ecuador, whose prices are between 
$703 and $1.009 pesos per Kg (USAID, 2009). 
 
5. The vulnerability of the small-scale farmers  
There are economic and environmental risks affecting the plantain growers, associated to market 
trends, tree diseases, and storms. Amid an extremely neoliberalized economy, the growers lack 
of permanent governmental support to face all those risks; they are exposed to the market trends 
but chiefly, they are affected by the intermediation of trader companies that regulate the access to 
transport, prices, and the distribution of benefits and costs. And the international cooperation 
supports some projects (USAID, 2009), but it is unable to benefit all the plantain growers. Thus, 
the small-scale farmers have created social organizations to raise their demands, amid 
nationwide protests of all the agricultural sectors against the Free Trade Agreements 
(TeleAntioquia, 2014). I will analyze these issues and trends, through the study of the emergence 
of small grower associations, and the recent crises including the environmental disasters, the 
debts accumulated by the trader companies, and the reduction in prices for the plantain 
producers.  
 
5.1. The emergence of associations of small-scale farmers 
 
The rise in the importance of plantain in Urabá produced the emergence of conflicts between the 
trader companies and associations of small-scale growers. This conflict also exhibits the class 
and socio-political conflicts in Urabá, whose axes relate to the access to the international markets 
which works in function of the size of global demands and the international prices; the 
distribution of benefits among the participants in the value chain; and the distribution of the costs 
and loses, related to the impacts of tree diseases, environmental disasters such as windstorms, 
falls in the international prices, and the effects of the exchange rates. 
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In Urabá have emerged various organizations of small-scale farmers of plantain, aiming to 
represent the interests and rising demands of the small-scale farmers. Two main organizations 
are identified: the ASCOLPAS (Colombian Association of Small Plantain Producers, or 
Asociación Colombiana de Pequeños productores de Plátano), created by members of the 
SINTRAINAGRO labor union, the main union of banana workers, with almost 18.000 affiliates 
(UITA, 2009); and FEDEPLAUR (Federation of plantain growers of Urabá, or Federación de 
Platanicultores de Urabá). 
 
On the one hand, ASCOLPAS was created by the UNAC (Unión Nacional Agroalimentaria de 
Colombia) and SINTRAINAGRO. The UNAC emerged in 2000 at the initiative of the 
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied 
Workers’ Associations (UITA). The UITA, created in 1920, groups labor unions from Europe 
and Latin America. It groups 380 organizations, from 122 countries, with 2,8 million 
contributors, which represents almost 12 million of members (IUTA, 2009). The Latin American 
branch of UITA, or Rel-UITA, groups 79 organizations in 17 countries (UITA, 2009). 
 
ASCOLPAS was an attempt to provide autonomy to small-scale farmers in Urabá, by a model of 
“solidarity economy”. It aimed to create their own trade company, and to eliminate the 
intermediaries that take larger profits in the chain. ASCOLPAS identifies as important to have 
transportation facilities to commercialize the plantain in Europe, as they have found trading 
networks. Among the benefited populations by the work of ASCOLPAS are ex-guerrilla fighters 
of the EPL,3 widows, the relatives of victims of violence, elders, and unemployed workers. For 
Sintrainagro, ASCOLPAS groups almost 25.000 producer families (UITA, 2009). Previously, 
those workers sold the production to the trader companies. And ASCOLPAS created their own 
trader company called PLATACOL (Organización de Comercialización y Exportación de 
Plátano). 
 
The small farmers cultivate plantain and food as well, to provision the markets of the region. The 
part produced for the global markets is transported in ships property of the trader companies. 
ASCOLPAS pays to the producers US$6 per box. This is higher than the price paid by 
BANACOL, between US $4 and $5. In 2005, it had agreements to export more than 5,000 boxes 
per week (Rel-UITA, 2005a). 
 
In 2005, there existed conflicts between the trader companies and ASCOLPAS, because the 
trader companies also produced plantain. ASCOLPAS denounced that the trader companies 
blocked the access to the port, under the defense of the companies by AUGURA (Rel-UITA, 
2005a; Rel-UITA, 2005b). 
 
On the other hand, FEDEPLAUR emerged in recent years. For this organization, the national and 
local governments have social debts with the small-scale farmers. This organization has aimed to 
promote the dialogue with the regional mayors. Among the denunciations made by 
                                                  
3
 Further research is necessary on the complex processes that affect the plantain production in Urabá. Several actors 
participating in this venture have been entangled with the regional dynamics of violence. It is necessary to analyze 
the role of different actors in the regional production, as the dynamics of production in Urabá always have included 
complex processes intertwined with the dynamics of the armed conflict, involving both the guerrillas and the 
paramilitaries (Uribe, 1992; García and Aramburo, 2011). 
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FEDEPLAUR are the “lack of guaranties for exporting, access to the port, costs of inputs, 
unequal struggles against the Sigatoka Negra, lack of renovation of crops, modernization of 
packagers, phytosanitary controls, lack of housing, and the sanitation facilities to cope with the 
demands of the export companies” (Color de Colombia, 2013).  
 
5.2. Vulnerability: environment and global markets 
 
Recent events in the Urabá region reveal the state of vulnerability of the small plantain growers, 
due to environmental catastrophes, and crises related to the structure of the international markets 
and contract farming schemes. 
 
On the one hand, the plantain trees have been destroyed by the effects of plagues of Sigatoka 
Negra and El Moco, but the small-scale farmers have less resources to prevent and to respond to 
the effects of those tree diseases. The Director of FEDEPLAUR stated that,  
“The government is already offering financial support for the farmers, chiefly for the 
control of the Sigatoka negra disease. However, this support is not enough to cope all the 
problems faced by those producers. The support from the government should be something 
permanent, and not just responding to a juncture, such as that one of the environmental 
crisis. We should seek solutions to create a zone free of Sigatoka; we also need support in 
fertilization issues” (Statement by Jesús M. Tovar, Director of FEDEPLAUR, 
TeleAntioquia, 2014). 
 
At the same time, in recent years, the farms have been affected by the effects of climatic events, 
including windstorms and floods, as well as drought. Due to its topographic characteristics, 
Antioquia presents frequent windstorms. The windstorms have origin in tropical waves from the 
Caribbean which cross through the plains of the Atlantic Coast and Urabá, to shock with the west 
and central mountain ranges, and then produce areas of encounter of over-charged humidity, 
producing short and destructive windstorms, affecting areas in Urabá (El Colombiano, 2012). 
After various months of drought, winds start by March, and are intensified between July and 
August. In recent years, a windstorm downed 800 ha of banana affecting the production for 
exports. And a strong windstorm affected chiefly the small-scale farmers, more than the banana 
growers. FEDEPLAUR informed that the 25% of almost 2000 growers were affected by the 
windstorm, chiefly in Currulao in Turbo Municipality – where a majority of growers are located 
–, and Chigorodó (El Colombiano, nd). However, a more strong windstorm occurred in July of 
2014 affecting almost 5.000 ha of crops, chiefly of plantain (TeleAntioquia, 2014; 
Hora13Noticias, 2014).  
 
On the other hand, The small-scale farmers face obstacles related to market trends, and the 
access to global markets, because they compete with the trader companies which also export 
plantain. Both groups use the existing export facilities for the banana trade. And the growers sign 
contracts with the trader companies to export the product.  
 
Recently, besides the effects of the Sigatoka and the windstorms, the trader companies have 
accumulated debts with the small-scale farmers to pay for the exportation plantains; and the 
trader companies have also reduced the price to buy the product for the small-scale farmers. 
These processes produced strong protests by the growers and their organizations. 
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Firstly, the BANACOL company has accumulated a debt with the small-scale farmers, as 
explained a representative of this company: 
“For various weeks we have not be able to pay for the shipments. We have accumulated 
nine weeks of no payment; we have accumulated a debt for almost 2 thousand million 
pesos” (Testimony of Holger Meneses, engineer, BANACOL, Hora13Noticias, 2014). 
 
The peasants met with representatives of BANACOL, and with the government in order to 
discuss the possible solutions for them, but they found nothing and organized a civic stoppage, 
blocking the road between Medellín and Turbo (Hora13Noticias, 2014). To solve this situation, 
the trader companies were demanding new credits from the government. However, the 
government refused to give those credits, asking the trader companies to make an effort to pay 
the debts to the growers and workers of the plantain farms (Hora13Noticias, 2014). 
 
Secondly, there is a volatility of prices and the exchange rate affecting this sector, but with worse 
impacts on the small-scale farmers. As explained a leader of an organization of plantain growers, 
“the (plantain) price is managed by mail-shots (circulares). They (the trader companies) increase 
the price a penny per mail-shot; or down a penny per mail-shot; but without intervention of the 
government. This situation has busted the plantain sector.” (Statement of a leader of Dignidad 
Platanera, TeleAntioquia, 2014). 
 
In August 2014, the trader companies stated that they reduced the price paid for each family for 
exported plantain box. The price was before at $ 9,70 US dollars; then it was reduced to US $ 8 
per box. And the dollar has been also going down. The trader companies said that the reduction 
in the price is product of the over-supply existing in the region, reaching almost 100.000 boxes 
per month, while the international market only buys 50.000 boxes per month. The representatives 
of the trader companies said that: 
“there is not any contract (between the trader companies and the growers) that guarantees 
that we (the trader companies) should pay (to the growers) US$ 9. Instead, the price that 
we pay to the producer is the price fixed by the market. If the market goes down, obviously 
we are also affected. With the bananas occurs the same thing.” (Statement by Jaime E. 
Gallo, President, Direction Body of AUGURA; TeleAntioquia, 2014). 
 
According to the “index of Colombian competitiveness with third countries in the United States 
market or ITCR-C” (Huertas, Villalba and Parra, 2003), which is a complementary (and very 
related) measure to the Real Exchange Rate, between 2000 and 2003 there was an increase in 
levels of competitiveness of main export products of Colombia to the US (coffee, flowers, 
banana and textiles). However, those levels decreased since 2003, with few recoveries in 2006, 
2008 and 2009. Since 2009, the levels of competitiveness with third countries (chiefly Ecuador, 
México, Guatemala and Costa Rica) has remained almost steady. The ITCR-C takes into 
account, not just the direct relationship with the trade partners, but the relevancy of the countries 
that compete with the Colombian exports (Huertas, Villalba and Parra, 2003). This long term 
trend in decreases in competitiveness related to the Real Exchange Rate has affected the different 
exportation sectors including the banana but also the plantain (Figure 8). 
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The trader companies have sought to solve this situation produced by the global markets by 
proposing the small holders to diversify and changing the harvesting product, because in their 
view, “the market is saturated”: 
“We could offer orientation, support and training to the producers, so that they could 
diversify. This means, that they should not harvest more plantain without having market 
for that. So, they should devote portions of their parcels to another crop”. Statement by 
Jaime E. Gallo, President, Direction Body of AUGURA; TeleAntioquia, 2014). 
 
Thus, from the point of view of the trader companies, the possibilities for social and economic 
upgrading for the small-farmers do not exist if they remain cultivating plantain. However, for the 
social organizations the situation is very unfair. They see in the plantain an alternative for having 
an income. Thus, the solution would not be to change the product, but instead, that the 
government help them to transport, and to commercialize the plantain, also by opening new 
markets, though the access to the markets is dominated by the trader companies that sell the fruit 
in international markets. Amid the recent crisis of prices and debts by the trader companies, 
FEDEPLAUR stated that: 
“We do expect to make a consensus in the topics of transport, inputs, and prices. We do 
need a consensus, avoiding that this would be the product of the will of just one of the 
engaged parts (in reference to the trader companies) (...) The possibilities of 
commercialization are several. But in Urabá we do not have any possibility to trade out the 
product. The trader companies own their private ports; and they do not sell out the service 
of transportation.” (Statement by Jesús M. Tovar, Director of FEDEPLAUR, 
TeleAntioquia, 2014). 
 
Additionally, the regional trends have shown that the attempts to introduce other crops such as 
oil palm to replace the banana have failed. This, due to the opposition made by the labor unions 
to the oil palm, because it is less labor-intensive; also, the oil palm has been affected in the 
region by the Butt Rot Disease; and the oil palm spread in new lands such as in Chocó, through 
violent primitive accumulation, seizing the lands of local peasants, and changing the land uses 
(CIJP, 2012; ColombiaLand, 2013). 
 
The vulnerability affecting the growers in relation to the recent environmental, prices, and 
indebtedness crises, produced that new organizations emerged, amid the national peasant protests 
against the effects of the Free Trade Agreements that the government signed with the United 
States and the European Union. This produced the emergence of the so-called DIGNIDAD 
AGROPECUARIA movement, and as associated to this process, emerged the DIGNIDAD 
PLATANERA movement, which led the strike and civil work stoppage in August 2014.  
DIGNIDAD AGROPECUARIA has complained because Colombia is buying 100.000 tons of 
plantain per year – chiefly from Ecuador –, instead of buying the national and local production. 
A leader of DIGNIDAD PLATANERA also stated that: 
“Currently, there are 26 organizations of plantain growers in Urabá, grouping Antioquia, 
Chocó and Córdoba, joining 15.000 families that are living from the plantain harvesting. 
The trader companies, and the government have done nothing to solve the crisis affecting 
the plantain sector” (TeleAntioquia, 2014). 
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The responses of the government amid this recent crisis, have revealed the exposure of the small-
scale farmers to the effects of the free markets, and the lack of permanent protection by the state. 
Recently, the Ministry of Agriculture stated that: 
“We will meet with the small-farmers; we will work in function of them, taking decisions 
that would favor them. They are small-scale farmers, which have been seriously damaged 
by flooding due to abundant rainfall, and we should defend the weakest sectors”. 
 
And the Vice-Minister of Rural Development stated that: 
“we are aware of the difficulties in the commercialization. And we do need to create the 
conditions to stabilize the prices to guarantee peace among the growers and their families. 
We are aware of the demands for infrastructure, housing, and for drainage and irrigation” 
(Hora13Noticias, 2014).  
 
Representatives of the regional government of Antioquia also stated that the regional situation is 
very unfair, but they also noted that “they could do nothing to handle the causes of the crisis, as 
they could not control the international prices of the fruit” (Hora13Noticias, 2014). 
 
After several days blockading the roads, and after the protests in which one died, 14 were 
injured, and 13 were put in jail, the plataneros achieved some actions and policies from the 
government to solve this crisis. The government accorded to create a table to discuss the raising 
in one dollar in the price of the plantain boxes (El Tiempo, 2014). And the government declared 
the situation of emergency; it also offered a subsidy for the small-farmers; and the farmers also 
obtained agreements on the theme of fertilizers (El Colombiano, 2014). 
 
However, those policies seem more like responses to this juncture, while the small-farmers will 
remain in a vulnerable situation. The statements made by representatives of the national and 
regional government proof the unequal situation experienced in this region amid the neoliberal 
globalization. The more benefited by the free markets have been the trader companies playing a 
role as intermediaries. They profit from the international trade which produces the major benefits 
in the chain; and they put the major costs and loses on the side of the small-scale farmers – also 
affected by the effects of the environment –, while the government offers just emergency 
responses to the crises. 
 
Preliminary conclusion and policy implications 
 
This article aimed at analyzing recent trends in the plantain value chain in Colombia, in the 
context of economic liberalization. The plantain chain exemplifies the effects of the global 
economy on the local conflicts and inequalities. On the one hand, the expansion of plantain in 
Urabá coincides with the regional land conflicts, including the violent dispossession to expand 
the agricultural frontier, such as in Chocó. Even so, the preliminary information presented here, 
reveals that the trader companies have more responsibility in explaining this trend, due to the 
effects of the contract farming scheme itself. The companies put farmers in those lands to 
produce for their own interests, and the companies directly and indirectly control those lands. 
Thus, the state may exert its territorial control in order to prevent the reproduction of cases of 
violent dispossession, which has been sustained through the contract farming scheme. 
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On the other hand, several risks affect the small-scale farmers. Firstly, despite the growing 
quantity of global production and the leading role of Colombia in exports, the growers face 
obstacles to access the global markets. The trader companies monopolize the places of 
transportation, and the commercialization canals as well. At least since 2005, the small-scale 
farmers organizations have complained about the unfair competition that perform the trader 
companies grouped in AUGURA. These processes reveal the existence of class-related conflicts 
and inequalities in the production and commercialization of exportation plantain. 
 
Secondly, the small-scale farmers have been affected by the impacts of windstorms. And the 
trees have been affected by plagues such as the Sigatoka Negra and El Moko. Even so, the small-
scale farmers complain about the lack of governmental programs to struggle against those 
diseases. And the effects of the environment have been worsened in junctures such as in July 
2014, when the global markets also produced unequal impacts on them. 
 
Finally, the plantain sector is an example of the vulnerability of the small-farmers amid the 
economic liberalization. The exporters of different commodities including the plantain, have 
suffered the decreases in competitiveness related with the exchange rates. And the trader 
companies have changed the price to buy the plantain to local growers. However, in recent years 
the FOB price has raised, and the volatility of prices in the European markets is low. It is not 
clear why the trader companies have stated that the trends in the international markets have taken 
the prices to the bottom. They have transmitted their loses to the local small-scale farmers, 
through the accumulation of debts. The small-scale farmers are at a disadvantageous position, 
because the regional and national government can control the exchange rates and market trends. 
 
The government put the responsibility to solve the recent crisis on the trader companies, by 
claiming that they may pay their debts to the farmers. But the trader companies state that the 
small-scale farmers may change of harvested product because the global market has over-supply. 
Even so, for the small-scale farmers – and for the international aid as well –, the plantain does 
offer an alternative for their global insertion, amid their opposition to the oil palm expansion. 
And one of the identified problems by organizations such as DIGNIDAD AGROPECUARIA, is 
that the country is importing cheap plantain, instead of buying the production to the local 
farmers. This value chain lacks a clear structure of governance; the small-scale farmers suffer the 
lack of a permanent governmental support to cope with those risks; and the international 
cooperation is unable to support all the growers. 
 
The growing world production, and the relatively steady prices, have contrasted with falls in the 
competitiveness associated to the exchange rate. Some policy alternatives may include: opening 
new markets for the product with governmental support; do not disregard the claims of 
organizations that demand more regulation to the imports, or at least to establish an open 
discussion on these issues, by listening the peasants proposals; taking advantage of the multiple 
plantain uses as an input in different food and animal feed industries to expand markets; and the 
state may adopt better instruments to increase the competitiveness of the farmers. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Map 1. The Urabá region (Antioquia Department). 
 
Source: the author 
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Figure 1. World plantain production (tons), 1961–2012 
 
Source: the author, based on FAO-STAT. 
 
Figure 2. Main plantain producer countries and produced value, 2012 
 
Source: the author, based on FAO-STAT. 
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Figure 4. Colombia - Production of plantain for exports (Tons) (1987-2011) 
 
Source: the author, based on Agronet,  
Sistema de Estadísticas Agropecuarias - SEA. 
 
Figure 5. Colombia - Production of regular plantain  
for national consumption (Tons) (1987-2011) 
 
Source: the author, based on Agronet,  
Sistema de Estadísticas Agropecuarias - SEA. 
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Figure 6. Colombian exports of fresh plantain, FOB price (US $ dollars)  
for the box of 23,24 Kg 
 
Source: the author, based on AUGURA (2013 and 2014). 
 
Figure 7. Colombian and Ecuadorian plantain export prices per Kg  
(weekly prices in Euros, 2013-2014). Higher and Lower Prices of imports in France 
 
Source: the author, based on International Trade Center (ITC). 
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Figure 8. Evolution of the Index of Colombian competitiveness with  
third countries in the United States market (ITCR-C) (1994=100) 
 
Source: The author, based on Banco de la República  
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Table 1. Plantain  - main export countries (2011) 
Country 
Exports 
(tonnes) % (exports) 
Value (1000 
$) 
Unit Value 
($/Tonn) 
Peru 108167 25.88 70337 650 
Guatemala 102296 24.48 31425 307 
Colombia 86974 20.81 40043 460 
Nicaragua 39690 9.50 7665 193 
Belgium 35843 8.58 32607 910 
Sri Lanka 10186 2.44 4086 401 
Costa Rica 5427 1.30 2684 495 
Netherlands 5279 1.26 6186 1172 
Ireland 4269 1.02 5490 1286 
Dominican Republic 3804 0.91 2201 579 
Panama 3396 0.81 1802 531 
Italy 2012 0.48 2221 1104 
Honduras 1892 0.45 536 283 
Others 8689 2.08     
TOTAL (World) 417924 100.00     
Source: the author, based on FAO-STAT. 
 
Table 2. Plantain  - main import countries (2011) 
Country 
Imports 
(tonnes) 
Share of 
world total  
Value (1000 
$) 
Unit Value 
($/Tonn) 
United States 269930 40.68 150773 559 
Netherlands 47668 7.18 56160 1178 
Belgium 62425 9.41 50798 814 
United Kingdom 34266 5.16 26641 777 
Spain 22565 3.40 17793 789 
Bulgaria 16698 2.52 17514 1049 
Romania 16250 2.45 14346 883 
France 14148 2.13 12947 915 
Macedonia 19087 2.88 12523 656 
Ireland 12586 1.90 11719 931 
El Salvador 62242 9.38 8486 136 
Italy 6007 0.91 5944 990 
Finland 4207 0.63 4597 1093 
Honduras 12247 1.85 3738 305 
Colombia 40621 6.12 3643 90 
Others 22532 3.40     
TOTAL (World) 663479 100.00     
Source: the author, based on FAO-STAT. 
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Table 3. Cropped area (hectares) of regular plantain and export  
plantain, national total and Antioquia Department, 1987-2012 
  Regular Plantain Export Plantain 
Year National Antioquia National Antioquia 
1987 358,900 42,000 6,080        6,080  
1988 361,720 42,400 7,050        7,000  
1989 372,300 34,500 7,000        7,000  
1990 344,803 39,632 7,000        7,000  
1991 347,035 46,457 7,000        7,000  
1992 356,678 32,302 23,000      23,000  
1993 371,225 34,784 23,045      23,045  
1994 375,370 39,921 12,783      12,783  
1995 385,876 40,639 12,139      12,139  
1996 385,174 36,094 13,117      13,117  
1997 373,089 36,283 10,880      10,880  
1998 366,035 35,560 14,038      14,038  
1999 341,004 36,122 14,096      14,096  
2000 376,895 48,595 13,899      13,899  
2001 381,796 51,982 13,899      13,899  
2002 364,807 44,827 16,849      16,849  
2003 364,438 41,654 16,915      16,915  
2004 371,855 44,148 15,733      15,733  
2005 364,149 44,065 17,304      17,304  
2006 356,974 41,363 16,612      16,612  
2007 360,898 41,038 14,785      14,785  
2008 340,902 39,945 15,598      15,598  
2009 333,375 40,622 15,512      15,156  
2010 352,116 41,573 16,277      15,240  
2011 357,525 41,353 16,849      15,845  
2012 378,884 45,591 17,033      16,146  
Source: the author, based on Agronet,  
Sistema de Estadísticas Agropecuarias - SEA. 
 
Table 4. Colombian plantain exports of Boxes of 23.24 Kg., by trader companies  
(2010-2013) 
Trader company 2010 % 2011 % 2012 % 2013 % 
UNIBAN 2270293 44.2 1587527 44.3 1957117 46.4 2146480 44.9 
BANACOL 2112344 41.1 1360050 37.9 1452126 34.4 1469258 30.7 
BANUR 613066 11.9 447368 12.5 228909 5.4 523917 11.0 
CONSERBA 139617 2.7 189752 5.3 579490 13.7 641151 13.4 
TOTAL 5135320 100.0 3584697 100.0 4217642 100.0 4780806 100.0 
Source: AUGURA (2013 and 2014). 
